Variables contextuales y comunidades nacionales imaginadas en los países de la UE-15 by Ruiz Jiménez, Antonia María et al.
MISCELÁNEA
Política y Sociedad
ISSN: 1130-8001
ISSN-e: 1988-3129
http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/POSO.50089
Country-level Variables and Imagined National Communities within
EU-15 Countries
Antonia María Ruiz Jiménez1, Elena Ferri Fuentevilla2 y Luis Navarro Ardoy3
Recibido: 15-09-2015 / Aceptado: 17-03-2016
Abstract. This study analyses to what extent there are similarities and differences between EU-15
countries with regard to their citizens’ national identities; as well as the influence of country-level
variables on identity patterns within clusters of countries. It uses different quantitative techniques and
the European Values Study 2008 data release. First, clusters of countries are formed using identity
variables.  Next,  country-level  variables  dealing  with economic  performance,  politics,  history  and
ethnic-cultural traits are operationalized and tested through categorical regression and discriminant
analysis. Results confirm that there are clusters of countries with particular configurations of identity
patterns and that country-level variables influence identity.
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[es] Variables  contextuales  y  comunidades  nacionales  imaginadas  en  los
países de la UE-15
Resumen.  Este estudio analiza las similitudes y diferencias entre los países de la UE-15 en cuanto a
las identidades nacionales de sus ciudadanos; así como la posible influencia de variables contextuales
sobre las configuraciones identitarias en conglomerados de países.  Para ello se utilizan diferentes
técnicas cuantitativas y los datos de la oleada 2008 de Encuesta Europea de Valores. En primer lugar
se forman conglomerados de países usando variables de identidad. A continuación se operacionalizan
variables  contextuales  de  rendimiento  económico,  políticas,  históricas,  y  étnico-culturales,  cuya
importancia para diferenciar los conglomerados formados previamente se contrasta mediante análisis
de regresión categórica y análisis discriminante. Los resultados constatan que existen conglomerados
de  países  con  configuraciones  identitarias  suficientemente  diferenciadas;  y  que  las  variables
contextuales seleccionadas influyen sobre sobre ellas.
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1. Introduction
Different states in Europe (for example Belgium, the United Kingdom and Spain)
seem to suffer from a lack of legitimacy connected to weak feelings of national
identity among their citizens. This is manifested in shifting legitimacies from the
state-wide to the regional community which is quantifiable through survey data and
observable, for example, in referendums (or attempts to hold referendums) in favor
of independence from the current State. As Easton (1965) and other authors point
out, the feeling of attachment to a political community gives it a kind of diffuse
support that seems to be central to its survival and continuity (Smith, 1991; Dalton,
2004).
The literature on national identity and nationalism in Spain offers us some clues
as to the variables that may currently influence the weakness of state-wide national
identities. Thus, taking Spain as a case study, different authors describe it as an
example of faulty national construction (Linz, 1973; Álvarez, 2000). Apart from
historical roots that account for this failure, the more contemporary monopolization
of patriotism by the Francoist regime explains an initial reluctance by leftist as well
as  rightist  parties  to  explicitly  develop  Spanish  patriotic  feelings  or  national
identity (De Blas, 1991; Mar-Molinero and Smith, 1996; Núñez, 2010; Quiroga,
2008). Although it seems that the Right has returned to an explicit reformulation of
democratic Spanish patriotism more easily that the Left (Bastida, 2002; De Blas,
2003: 772; Mateo, 2005), the definition of Spain as a nation continues to be an
object  of  political  controversy,  not  only  among  nation-wide  parties  but  also
between  these  and  regionalist/nationalist  parties  (Núñez,  2010).  In  summary,
Spanish parties have not instilled consistent feelings of identification with Spain as
a political community. 
It  has  also  been  pointed  out  that  exclusive  Spanish  national  identity  has
decreased as regional and dual identities have increased, in parallel to the process
of development of the Autonomous State and as a consequence of it (Díez, 1999;
García, 2002; Mota, 2008). In this context also, regional parties have introduced
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new dimensions of political competition in which Spanish national identity is not
relevant or is even disputed (Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Libbrecht et al., 2011). 
If we look for these variables within a wider context, we find other countries
among  Spain’s  European  neighbors  that  share  some  of  the  aforementioned
characteristics  and  developments.  Italy,  Germany,  Greece  and Portugal  share  a
similar past of monopolization of patriotism by fascist, authoritarian or totalitarian
regimes.  Belgium,  Germany  and  Italy  have  similar  levels  of  decentralization.
Regional parties also exist in other democracies, such as Italy, Germany or the UK.
It is therefore reasonable to ask how similar the configuration of national identities
is  among  European  states,  and  how  great  the  impact  of  these  country-level
variables is in those configurations. These are the main objectives of this article. 
For this investigation, we use data from the last European Values Study release
(2008). Using questions relating to individual feelings of belonging, national pride
and  the  kind  of  imagined  community  (that  is,  the  most  important  element  of
membership of the community), we cluster countries according to the answers of
their citizens. We then profile countries according to variables mentioned above.
Using this information we carry out discriminant analysis to test whether country-
level variables are significantly different among the cluster of countries previously
grouped together. We close this article by offering conclusions about similarities
and differences between clusters of European countries and the importance of the
country-level variables that seem to play a role in the configuration of identities.
2. National identity: a definition and its operationalization
In line with modernist and constructivist scholars, we define national identity as the
individual  feeling of  belonging to  an imagined political  community (Anderson,
1991). As summarized by McEwen (2006: 31-32):
Nationhood (…) rests upon an inter-related subjective and collective dimension.
The collective  dimension  concerns  the  shared  meanings  of  what  it  means  to  be
Scottish,  British,  Canadian,  etc.,  while  the subjective  dimension is  related  to  the
individual’s sense of identity and belonging, and the consent she may confer upon
the nation with which she identifies. 
This article is concerned with the subjective dimension of national identity, which
is possible  to measure through survey analysis,  despite the  debate  on the most
appropriate measurement (Ruiz, 2007).
As table 1 shows the operationalization of our first dependent variable (national
identity) includes cognitive and evaluative levels (see Kaina and Krolewski, 2009).
The cognitive level refers mainly to the feeling of territorial belonging: to which
geographical  group  does  the  respondent  think  s/he  belongs  first  of  all.  The
evaluative level includes the strength of territorial bonding, as well as the type of
elements  that  the  respondent  thinks  of  as  the  most  important  for  the  national
community.  These  last  items  clearly  refer  to  the  concept  of  the  nation  as  an
imagined community  (Anderson,  1991;  Lepsius,  1994),  and  point  towards  two
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ideal versions of a nation: either an ethnic-cultural community or a civic-political
community (Smith, 1991; Máiz, 2003; Lepsius, 2004; Ichijo and Spohn, 2005).
Based on the different combinations of percentages of people who identify with
each territorial level, the percentage of people proud of their nationality and the
percentage of people who consider each of the different possible elements to be
important in order to be truly national, we distinguished clusters of countries with
similar configurations of national identity as a first step in our analysis.
Table 1. Operationalization of national identity (as a sense of belonging to an imagined  
community) in 2008 European Values Study
QUESTION 
(variable) Wording Scale
Dimension of 
dependent 
variable
Q69 (v253)
Which of these geographical groups would you say you 
belong to first of all? 
(1, Locality or town where you live; 2, region of country
where you live; 3, [COUNTRY]; 4, Europe; 5, the word 
as a whole).
Nominal
Sense of 
territorial 
belonging
Q72 (v256)
How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen? 
(*Filtered, asked only to citizens of [COUNTRY]).
(1, very proud to 4, nor at all proud).
Ordinal
Strength of 
territorial 
bonding
Q80 (v276-80)
Some people say the following things are Important for 
being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not 
important. How important do you think each of the 
following is?
(1, To have been born in [COUNTRY]; 2, To respect 
[COUNTRY]’s political institutions and laws; 3, To 
have [COUNTRY]’s ancestry; 4, To be able to speak 
[THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE] [NOTE: if more than 
one national languages, ask the national languages]; 5, 
To have lived for a long time in [COUNTRY])
(1, very important to 4, not important at all)
Ordinal
Imagined-
shared 
elements 
within 
community
Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.
3. Theorizing  and  modeling  the  influence  of  country-level  variables  on
individual identities
General theories about nationalism understand national identity as the basis for the
emergence  (primordialist  or  essentialist  theories)  or  the  building  (modernist  or
constructivist theories) of nations, usually understood as nation-states (Ferri, 2013).
They also contain implicit or explicit accounts of the factors believed to define or
create  national  identity.  We  depart  from  these  theories  to  tackle  some  of  the
variables  that  may  explain  different  configurations  of  national  identities  in
particular countries, trying also to model other specific explanations that have been
given for particular states.
Perhaps the most evident variable to take into account would be the ethnic and
cultural homogeneity among the people living within a country or state. For ethnic
nationalism,  people  who  share  an  ethnic  origin  and  cultural  characteristics  are
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usually understood as a nation; for primordialists and essentialists the nation pre-
existed and explains the creation of the state. Modernist and constructivist theories
reject  this  idea,  arguing  that  nations  are  collectively  imagined  after  and  as  a
consequence of the invention of the state (Ferri, 2013: chapter 2; De Blas, 1984;
Kedourie, 1985; Anderson 1991; Gellner, 1997; Lepsius, 2004). However, nations
cannot be deliberatively invented out of nothing. On the contrary, nations grow
from the reinterpretation of pre-existing cultural  traits  and the reconstruction of
previous ethnic links and feelings (Smith, 2004). Thus, different authors argue that
the ethnic and/or cultural homogeneity of a people, usually understood/imagined as
sharing  blood  linkages,  common  ancestors,  language,  religion,  myths  and/or
symbols,  are at  the base of nationalism (Gellner,  1983;  Anderson,  1991;  1994;
Østerud, 1999; Smith, 2010). Although many of these ethnic and cultural variables
could be operationalized independently,  we think that the concept  of  the ethnic
composition of majorities in the country, plus the percentage of immigration, could
be considered as good proxies (at the same time maintaining the parsimony of the
model). Our expectation would be that there is a positive correlation between the
ethnic  homogeneity  of  a  country  and the  state-wide  national  identity.  Religion
however will be given a particular status within our analysis: classic models such
as Rokkan’s (1999) characterize distance to Rome as a relevant variable explaining
the emergence of nations (really understood as the creation of nation-states). Thus,
territories closer to Rome had more difficulty in becoming established as nation-
states due to the universalistic and homogeneous leanings of the Catholic Church.
Those other, more distant  territories where Protestantism predominated found it
easier  to  create  their  nation-states.  Our  expectation  is  that,  nowadays,  religion
(Catholic and Protestant alike) has a minor influence, if any, on the creation or
holding  of  state-wide  national  identities.  We  also  test  the  influence  of
secularization on state-wide national identity.
A third variable to consider is the politicization of identities. Most constructivist
scholars would agree that a collective understanding of the meaning of nationality
is necessary to anchor the individual  feeling of belonging to a nation.  Political
elites reinforce those meanings, developing and promoting definitions about who
the people are and what it is “we” represent (Jaffrelot, 1993; Dekker et al., 2003;
Gellner, 1983; Ranger and Hobsbawn 1983; Smith, 2000). Thus, the politicization
of  identities  has  usually  become  a  basis  for  nationalism  and  the  demands  of
political independence (Breuilly, 1990; Gellner,  1983; Smith, 1986; Linz, 1993;
Hroch,  1985).  Yet,  Right  and  Left  have  progressed  along  different  nationalist
paths. From a historic point of view nationalism has been possible within rightist as
well as leftist ideologies. However, the relations between nationalism and leftist
parties have been more difficult and contradictory than with rightist parties. This is
due to the ideological basis of the Left being more universalistic (Kasprzak, 2012)
and of Marxist inspiration (Howell, 1986; Schwarzmantel, 2012). Nevertheless, the
Left has re-elaborated new versions of the ethnic-cultural nationalism that are more
inclusive, categorizing the concept of multiculturalism, that have been labeled as
“constitutional nationalism”, “pluralist nationalism”, “constitutional patriotism” or
“democratic patriotism” (Habermas, 1992; Bastida, 2002; Laborda, 2002; Müller,
2007; Máiz, 2003). In parallel, new contemporary versions of “social patriotism”
(Field,  1992;  Lim,  1995) and the “class nation” (Lepsius,  2004),  on which the
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concept of the nation as a political community put its emphasis on the ideas of
equality and social justice, should be mentioned (Jackson, 2012; Ruiz and Navarro,
2015).  Therefore,  as  regards  Left-Right  ideology,  as  a  general  concept,  our
expectation is that both might be equally related to the existence of nation-wide
national identities, especially in the context of well-established states where only
banal nationalist mobilization is expected to take place (Billig, 1995).
However,  when we discuss  the  contemporary politicization of  identities,  the
existence of sub-state nationalist  or regionalist  parties might  be more important
than the Left-Right leaning of citizens, especially in the case that they represent a
criticism of the central state or demand more autonomy for the regions or localities
(Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Libbrecht et al., 2011; Hroch, 1985; Smith, 2000; De
Blas, 1994). Therefore, we used the politicization of the centre-periphery cleavage
in the political discourse (electoral programs) as a proxy for the politicization of
identities. Our expectation is that there might be a negative correlation between the
saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage and the state-wide national identity. This
variable  indicates  that  central  features  of  the  political  community,  such  as  its
political-administrative structure, its cultural characteristics or its mutual solidarity
obligations,  are  not  unanimously  accepted,  but  questioned,  discussed  and
challenged. The stronger the saliency of this cleavage, the less clearly citizens will
feel about their sense of belonging to the different proposals and traits of a political
community.
As stated above, modernist scholars (Kedourie, 1985; Gellner, 1997; Harrison
et al.,  1991; Caciagly, 2006) consider the political and economic modernization
(the end of the political Old Regime and the development of industrialization) that
ended with the creation of the modern nation-state to be the origin of national
identities.  In  a  similar  vein,  but  from a  more contemporary  point  of  view,  the
development of modern welfare states brought an extension of economic, political
and  social  rights  that  develop  a  sense  of  belonging  to  a  group  among  whose
members  a  sense  of  national  solidarity  was/is  established  as  a  consequence
(McEwen,  2002;  McEwen  and  Moreno,  2005;  Keating,  2009).  A  particular
application of this type of “instrumental” development of identity (Brass, 1979;
Cinnerella, 1997) can also be found in the possible building of a European identity
(Gabel, 1998; Eichemberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Kaltenthaler
and Anderson, 2001; Olsen, 1996; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Fernández-Albertos and
Sánchez-Cuenca,  2002)  and also in  the  development  of  regional  identities  as  a
consequence  of  the  decentralization  of  welfare  regimes (McEwen and Moreno,
2005).  Therefore we consider the hypothesis of instrumental identity, related to
wellbeing,  in  fourth place.  As proxies  for  modernization and welfare,  we have
considered the GDP of  countries  and its  redistribution among their  citizens  (as
redistribution is one of the main characteristics of welfare states).
Different  authors  have  analyzed  the  effects  of  sub-state  elections  in  forcing
nation-wide political parties to “regionalize” their structure and tactics, in Spain
(Pallárés and Keating, 2003; Libbrecht  et al., 2011), as well as in other countries
(Houten,  2009;  Hopkin  and  Bradbury,  2006;  Chhibber  and  Kollman,  2004;
Brancati, 2008). Thus, whether it is due to the political manipulation of regional
political elites or to the regionalization of welfare regimes (Mota, 1998: 5; 2008;
Díez,  1999;  Martínez-Herrera,  2002:  424-6;  McEwen  and  Moreno,  2005),
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decentralization has been related to the development of regional identities at the
cost of state-wide national identities (Jiménez and Navarro, 2015). We put this idea
to the test taking into account the level of political decentralization of countries as
measured by the Regional  Authority Index developed by Hooghe  et al. (2010).
Although we expect a negative correlation between RAI and state-wide national
identity, we do not assume any directional causal relation. 
Finally, we consider recent history, which has experienced a monopolization of
patriotism by fascist, totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. Although political elites
develop  and  promote  a  shared  meaning  of  the  nation,  the  monopolization  of
patriotism implies  limiting this  concept  through the addition of  alien meanings
such  as  particular  ideologies,  values,  norms,  support  for  a  leader,  etc.,  which
simultaneously excludes those who do not share these added elements (Bar-Tal,
1997: 249). Particularly in the case of fascism (as well as rightist totalitarian and
authoritarian regimes) in Europe, this monopolization has alienated the left from a
positive idea of nationalism (Hobsbawn, 1996; Bal-Tar, 1997; Talshir, 2005; Ruiz
et al., 2013). Therefore our expectation is that there might be a negative correlation
between  having  experienced  the  monopolization  of  patriotism  by  fascism,
totalitarian or authoritarian regimes and the state-wide national identity.
Table 2 offers further details on the country-level variables modeled and their
operationalization. 
Table 2. Operationalization  of  country-level  variables  with  possible impact  in  citizens’  
configurations of national identity
Variable Indicator Data
Ethnic majority 
in the country
Percentage of largest ethnic group, year 
2000 approx. (depending on country).
Pan, Chistoph & Pfeil Beate Sibylle Pfeil 
(2003). National Minorities in Europe: 
Handbook. Austria: Braumüller.
Immigrant 
population
Crude rates of population change: net 
migration plus adjustment, per 1000 
population, year 2008.
Eurostat Data in focus – 31/2009 (table 
2; page 3).
Secularization of
country
Percentage of population in the country 
not belonging to any religious 
denomination
2008 European Values Study, Q23 
(v105)
Catholicism
Percentage of population in the country 
belonging to Roman Catholic religious 
denomination
2008 European Values Study, Q23a 
(v106)
Protestantism
Percentage of population in the country 
belonging to Protestant religious 
denomination
2008 European Values Study, Q23a 
(v106)
Leftist 
population 
within the 
country
Percentage of population in the country 
located between 1 and 4 in the 
ideological scale.
2008 European Values Study, 
recodification of Q57 (v193)
Rightist 
population 
within the 
country
Percentage of population in the country 
located between 7 and 10 in the 
ideological scale.
2008 European Values Study, 
recodification of Q57 (v193)
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Variable Indicator Data
Politization of 
the centre-
periphery 
cleavage
Manifestos Project Dataset
*Saliency 2008 (or previous closer 
election): percentage of discourse 
devoted to the centre-periphery cleavage
in parties’ electoral manifestoes, 
aggregated by countries.
* Trend in politization: current (2008) 
saliency minus two previous elections’ 
average saliency, aggregated by 
countries.
Cleavage centre-periphery= 
=(302+601+608+
+301+602+607)*
* Pervote/100
Volkens, Andrea Lehmann, Pola Merz, 
Nicolas Regel, Sven Werner, Annika 
with Lacewell, Onawa Promise Schultze, 
Henrike (2013). The Manifesto Data 
Collection. Manifesto Project 
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Berlin: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung (WZB).
(https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/).
Level of political
decentralization
* Regional Authority Index (RAI), year 
2006
Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. 
Schaket (2010). The rise of regional 
authority: a comparative study of 42 
democracies (1950-2006). London: 
Routledge.
(http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/data_ra.p
hp)
Gross Domestic 
Product
GDP per capita in PPPs (purchasing 
power parities), year 2008 (base EU 28 
countries)
Eurostat webpage: tables, graphs and 
maps interface (TGM)
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu)
Economic 
equality 
(welfare)
Gini coefficient of equalized disposable 
income (source: SILC), year 2008.
Eurostat webpage: tables, graphs and 
maps interface (TGM)
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu)
Monopolization 
of patriotism
Experience of monopolization of 
patriotism (Bar-Tal definition). 
Bar-Tal, Daniel (1997). “The 
monopolization of patriotism”, en 
Daniel Bar-Tal, Ervin Staub (eds.). 
Monopolization of patriotism. 
Patriotism: In the Lives of Individuals 
and Nations.: Nelson Hall, pp. 246-270.
Italy (1922-1943), 
Greece (1931-1946),
Germany (1933-1945), 
Portugal (1933-1974), 
Spain (1939-1977).
Source: Authors.
4. The  configuration  of  national  identities  in  EU-15  neighbor  countries:  a
cluster analysis
As a first step in our analysis, we test if Spain is a particular case among EU-15
member-states, or if there are other countries whose citizens’ feelings toward the
nation are similar. We work with aggregate data: the percentage of citizens who
identify themselves primarily with each territorial level, the percentage of citizens
proud of their national identity and the percentage of citizens who consider each of
different elements to be important in order to be truly national, as shown in table 3.
Looking at the percentage of people that identifies primarily with their country, the
average for the EU-15 countries is 33 percent. Spain is below this average, but so
are Germany, Sweden, Portugal and Denmark, Ireland, Austria and Italy; these last
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three with percentages quite close to Spain. If we focus on regional identity, Spain,
together  with  Portugal  and  Great  Britain  locate  themselves  above  the  EU-15
average (16%). As two further examples, consider the percentage of people who
believes that have been born in the country is important to be truly national, with
an average of 64 percent for the EU-15, and the percentage of people who thinks
that having ancestor from the country is important to be considered truly national
(53%). Spain is below these averages, but so are Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Belgium,
Greece and Finland (in the case of born) plus Germany and Luxembourg (in the
case of ancestors).
Therefore, the descriptive analysis of the variables (confirmed by Lavene’s test)
shows  that  variance  is  substantively  different  across  countries,  which  is  a
fundamental requirement to carry on a cluster analysis. At the same time, table 3,
clearly indicates that Spain shares different identity traits with other countries.
Cluster analysis allows us to group countries in such a way that those in the
same cluster are the most similar among themselves, and the most dissimilar with
countries  in  other  groups.  That  is,  countries  within  each  cluster  will  be
homogeneous (as much as possible, considering all the variables at the same time),
while clusters will be the most heterogeneous among themselves. We carried out a
non-hierarchical  cluster  analysis  with  the  purpose  of  determine  the  number  of
clusters to be formed, and later on used a K-mean cluster analysis to establish the
composition  of  each  of  the  groups.  Table  4  shows  the  configuration  of  these
clusters.
The distance of each country to the centroid of the group in table 4 shows that,
while Portugal belongs together with Great Britain and Greece in cluster one, this
is the most dissimilar country among the three of them. Within the second cluster,
Finland and France are the most dissimilar countries, while Belgium, Denmark,
Luxembourg, Sweden and the Netherlands are quite close together. Spain belongs
to the third cluster with Austria,  Italy and Germany, this last country being the
most dissimilar among them. Ireland, in the fourth cluster, is quite homogeneous.
Table 5 helps us understanding how these four clusters were formed.
In the ANOVA table (table 5) variables with the largest F discriminates first and
foremost among the clusters. As can be seen the type of imagined community has a
clear impact on the formation of clusters, all items being statistically significant at
the level of a 95% confidence interval. Table 5 shows that the importance given to
have been born in the country is the most important variable discriminating among
groups.  As  pointed  in  table  6,  the  importance  attached  to  this  fact  mainly
differentiates  cluster  number  two,  with  lower  percentage  of  people  considering
important the fact of have been born in the country, from the rest of clusters. The
second most important variable is the importance attached to have ancestors, which
differentiate, again, cluster two, with lower average of citizens giving importance
to  ancestors,  from the  rest  (table  6).  These  two  variables  configure  an  ethno-
cultural understanding of identities (a dimension based on the  jus sanguine) that
seem to be much less prominent among countries in cluster two than the rest. 
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Table 3. Percentage  of  citizens  on  each  category  of  the  dependent  variable(a),
by countries (European Values Study 2008)
%
local
identi
ty
%
regio
nal
identi
ty
%
natio
nal
identi
ty
%
Euro
pean
identi
ty
%
word
-wide
identi
ty
%
natio
nal
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Germany 39,8 38,9 12,8 4,3 4,2 75,78 72,28 94,18 49,9 94,82 79,05
Ireland 59,7 12,5 23,6 1,6 2,6 98,72 45,89 95,82 43,46 87,97 63,52
Spain 46,6 16,2 25,3 2,3 9,7 92,65 45,5 97,52 40,41 98,13 50
Austria 24,7 35,8 27,4 6,6 5,6 89,27 62,77 97,65 50 89,24 77,55
Italy 45,5 11,4 28,9 4,8 9,4 87,38 46,66 98,47 39,79 96,54 54,48
Sweden 47,3 10,5 30,6 5,1 6,5 87,43 58,38 96,38 59,77 97,43 69,82
Portugal 43,8 16,4 31,5 2,3 6 94,87 73,75 95,21 65,59 96,97 73,11
Denmark 41,4 21,7 31,7 3,1 2 90,81 76,08 95,02 91,04 94,67 83,4
Northern 
Ireland
52,8 10 32,8 2,2 2,2 96,15 86,32 93,03 80,14 70,13 75,84
Luxembourg 29,2 9,3 33,3 20,6 7,6 91,61 75,69 97,25 45,07 92,14 75,91
Belgium 29,5 22,2 33,6 6,7 8 87,66 42,14 94,99 25,78 88,84 71,29
Great Britain 39,1 17,4 35,7 2,2 5,6 91,15 82,39 85,8 70,84 39,75 77
France 33,8 12,8 36,7 5,7 11 90,88 80,23 92,06 79,7 93,26 83,34
The 
Netherlands
40,7 8,6 37,3 5,2 8,2 86,06 74,28 93,57 55,01 92,15 74,26
Greece 32,6 14 46 2,6 4,8 94,68 49,51 96,11 36,81 97,27 76,5
Finland 19,7 12,5 56,6 6,5 4,8 93,25 47,93 94,31 21,8 98,9 47,22
Average 
(error) 
39,13
(2,6)
16,88
(2,3)
32,73
(2,4)
5,11
(1,1)
6,14
(1,3)
90,52
(1,3)
63,73
(3,4)
94,83
(0,7)
53,44
(5,0)
89,26
(3,7)
70,77
(2,8)
(a)Variables were recoded and then aggregated by countries. Local, regional, national, European and
word-wide identities were not transformed (Q69, v253 in table I). National pride (Q72, v256 in table
I) was recoded as a dummy variable; percentage in the table corresponds to the sum of values very
proud and quite proud. All other remaining variables, related to the relative importance of different
elements to be truly national (Q80, v276-80 in table I), were recoded as dummies; percentages in the
table correspond to sum of very important and quite important.
Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.
The importance given to being able to speak the country’s language and respect
political  institutions  and  laws  stand  out  as  the  third  and  four  most  important
variables, respectively, for the formation of clusters (table 5). They discriminate
mainly cluster four, with lower average on both variables, from the rest (table 6). In
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contrast to the former two most important variables, these seem to ascertain a civic
dimension  of  identity  (an  understanding  based  on  the  jus  solis)  which  is  less
important is Ireland as compared to the rest of clusters.
Table 4. Composition of clusters (K-mean analysis)
COUNTRY Cluster Distance
Great Britain 1 14,151
Greece 1 16,119
Portugal 1 9,451
Belgium 2 13,984
Denmark 2 13,423
Finland 2 31,769
France 2 5,235
Luxembourg 2 16,128
Sweden 2 15,343
The Netherlands 2 18,366
Austria 3 18,697
Germany 3 24,679
Italy 3 19,054
Spain 3 14,754
Ireland 4 17,480
Northern Ireland 4 17,480
Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.
Most  of  the  variables  regarding  the  territorial  sense  of  belonging  are  also
significant.  Being proud to be national  is  the fifth most  important  variable and
distinguishes clusters two and three, with lower percentage of people sharing this
feeling, from the rest. In decreasing order (table 5), local identity is less important
in cluster four than the rest; national identity is lower in clusters three and four than
in cluster one and two; and regional identity is higher in cluster three than the rest
(table 6). Regional identity however is not statistically significant.
These results are plausible, which can usually be taken as proof of face validity
and the first  test  of  validity  any kind of  analysis  must  meet.  However,  cluster
analysis has weaknesses, and discriminant analysis is frequently undertaken as a
way to confirm the solution proposed by a cluster analysis. We followed this same
path and carried out discriminant and multinomial regression analyses using the
individual EVS 2008 database to further validate the results of the previous cluster
analysis. We used the same identity variables (see table 1) and employed analytical
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and  cross-validation  samples  (50%  of  random  cases)  as  well  as  bootstrap
techniques  to  test  the  stability  of  our  solution.  We  transformed  non-normal
variables into dummies and proceed with the analysis, although we acknowledge a
moderate problem of heteroscedasticity for particular variables. 
Table 5. ANOVA: Statistical significance of each variable on the differentiation of clusters
Cluster Error
F Sig.
Cuadratic
mean df
Cuadratic
mean Df
% F_Territorial id.: Locality or 
town 245,505 3 76,219 12 3,221 ,061
% F_Territorial id.: Region 
country 142,960 3 64,488 12 2,217 ,139
% F_Territorial id.: Nation as a 
whole 194,707 3 66,188 12 2,942 ,076
% Proud to be national 66,924 3 17,874 12 3,744 ,042
% important born in country 1038,676 3 40,383 12 25,721 ,000
% important respect political 
institutions and laws 26,264 3 4,622 12 5,683 ,012
% important have ancestry 1608,515 3 89,705 12 17,931 ,000
% important able to speak 
language 898,471 3 52,618 12 17,075 ,000
Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.
Our discriminant analysis finds 3 canonical functions that explain 64, 21 and 15
percent, respectively, of the total variance among clusters of countries. As can be
seen in table 7, the first function is defined mainly by the importance given to the
fact  of  having been born in  the  country to  be truly national,  and distinguishes
clusters 1 and 4 (closer to this first canonical function’s centroid) from clusters 2
and 3 (table 8). The second canonical function is defined mainly by the importance
given  to  having  ancestry  and  to  speaking  the  country’s  language  to  be  truly
national (however speaking the language was moderately heterocedastic). It mainly
differentiates clusters 1 and 3 from clusters 2 and 4. Finally, the last function is
defined by the positive correlation with national identity and pride and negative
correlation with regional identity (table 7).  This function distinguishes cluster 3
from the rest, having a negative centroid in this function, countries in this cluster
are  characterized  by  having  less  national  identity  and pride  and more  regional
identity than others (table 8). Despite the differences between both methods, these
results roughly coincide with the way in which the K-mean procedure stablished
the groups in the first place. 
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Table 6. Characterization  of  clusters  on  each  discriminant  variable:  average  value  of  
discriminant variables for each cluster
Discriminant variables
Cluster
1 2 3 4
% F_Territorial id.: Locality or town 38,50 34,51 39,15 56,25
% F_Territorial id.: Region country 15,93 13,94 25,58 11,25
% F_Territorial id.: Nation as a whole 37,73 37,11 23,60 28,20
% Proud to be national 93,57 89,67 86,27 97,44
% important born in country 76,69 48,63 70,16 84,36
% important respect political institutions and laws 94,10 96,41 95,35 89,42
% important have ancestry 78,78 36,86 52,44 75,49
% important able to speak language 94,97 93,84 94,14 54,94
Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.
Table 7. Structure matrix of canonical functions
Function
1 2 3
IMP_born ,517* ,386 -,237
ID_town ,234* -,152 -,058
IMP_laws -,177* -,022 ,034
IMP_speak -,584 ,716* ,045
IMP_ancestry ,625 ,694* ,211
ID_country -,109 ,031 ,620*
ID_region -,007 ,224 -,605*
NAT_pride ,147 -,017 ,505*
Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.
A way to ascertain the goodness of fit in discriminant analysis is to compare how
well are we able to predict the cluster of belonging using the discriminant functions
as  compared  to  using  no  information.  Since  we  have  four  clusters,  we  could
randomly assign 25 percent of our individuals to each cluster (equal probabilities)
or we could assign a percentage of people proportional to the size of each group
(unequal  probabilities).  Our discriminant functions are able to correctly classify
45,3% of the selected cases, and 46,5% of the validation sample. This represents an
improvement over random assignment of cases to clusters. If we consider unequal
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probabilities according to the number of cases in each cluster,  our discriminant
analysis significantly increases our capacity to classify cases in clusters 1 and 4 (by
41,7% and 34,7% respectively, as compared to random assignment). However, it
does not increase this capacity at all regarding clusters 2 and 3.
Table 8. Clusters’ centroids in each canonical function
FOUR_cluster_k.means
Function
1 2 3
1,00 ,336 ,397 ,233
2,00 -,386 -,178 ,123
3,00 -,022 ,100 -,336
4,00 1,403 -,581 ,010
Discriminant canonical functions non-typified evaluated on groups’ mean.
Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.
A  logit  multinomial  regression  run  with  the  same  dependent  and  independent
variables confirms that all the variables are statistically significant (either for one
or another cluster of countries). Its classificatory power is similar to that which we
found  through  discriminant  analysis:  47,9%  of  cases  correctly  classify  on  the
whole, representing a significant improvement over random assignment for clusters
1 (50,7%, as compared to 21%), 2 (63,8%, as compared to 42%), and 4 (30%, as
compared to 7%), but not for cluster 3.
In summary, our analysis shows that the four groups of countries formed by our
k-mean cluster analysis of aggregated data are valid: the clusters of countries are
significantly different in the identity variables introduced in the analysis. In fact, by
knowing  only  the  type  of  territorial  identity  and  imagined  community  of  an
individual we can correctly assign that individual to a cluster of countries with a
higher probability than assigning simply by chance. This means that Spain share
identity  characteristics  with  other  EU-15  countries.  However,  are  some  of  the
particular  explanations traditionally offered to understand the Spanish case also
applicable to other countries? Are there contextual factors that correlate with this
clustering of countries?
5. The impact of country-level variables on identities
As mentioned above, our main objective is to explore if these clusters of countries
can be further  explained by other  aggregate  country-level  context  variables.  In
other  words,  we would like  to  test  whether  country level  variables do have an
impact on individual national identities. Our main interest is just to test this, as a
first approximation to the topic, not to measure the strength of the influence or
compare it against other individual variables. 
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Table 9. Descriptive analysis of cluster of countries on profiling variables
Cluster 1:
Greece,
Portugal, Great
Britain
Cluster 2:
Belgium,
Denmark,
Finland, France,
Luxembourg,
Netherlands,
Sweden
Cluster 3:
Austria,
Germany, Italy,
Spain
ETNIA_MAY
Percentage of ethnic majority in the country
Average 92,7649 81,2520 87,6420
Standard 
deviation 6,55420 14,27117 6,53075
INMIG_2008
Percentage of immigrant population
Average 2,5625 5,7632 4,6835
Standard 
deviation 1,20925 4,75797 3,60236
NOREL
Percentage of population belonging to no 
religious denomination (secularization)
Average 19,5589 34,2666 28,3080
Standard 
deviation 16,47631 12,74917 12,28809
CATHOL
Percentage of population declaring a Roman 
Catholic religion denomination
Average 38,5698 49,0900 73,2568
Standard 
deviation 41,04567 39,92274 22,22491
PROTEST
Percentage of population declaring a 
Protestant religion denomination
Average 31,4185 41,7278 17,4759
Standard 
deviation 27,55509 43,066818 22,55101
RIGHTPOP
Percentage or population holding rightist 
ideology (7-10)
Average 24,3891 29,885 20,5597
Standard 
deviation 4,38997 8,79414 5,85353
LEFTPOP
Percentage or population holding leftist 
ideology (1-4)
Average 30,8350 31,4943 35,7292
Standard 
deviation 5,88640 3,68142 8,86843
POLIT_2008
Politization of the centre-periphere cleavage-
Saliency
Average 5,5292 5,8026 4,2846
Standard 
deviation ,26213 2,41142 ,91983
POLIT_trend
Politization of the centre-periphere cleavage-
Trend
Average -1,4408 ,7518 ,3147
Standard 
deviation 2,06121 2,39500 ,39686
RAI_2006
Level of political decentralization
Average 7,6767 12,4220 23,5628
Standard 
deviation 2,91122 8,31700 4,25178
GINI_2008
Economic equility (welfare)
Average 34,3770 26,9799 29,8555
Standard 
deviation 1,03396 1,73682 2,08423
GDP_in_PPS_2008
Gross Domestic Product
Average 95,0559 143,9148 112,5721
Standard 
deviation 14,85769 53,19962 8,52116
MONOPOL(*)
Monopolization of patriotism
Average ,6617 0 ,7714
Standard 
deviation ,47319 0 ,41999
(*) Monopol is measured as a dummy variable, with values 1, in the case of monopolization, and 0 in 
all other cases.
Source: As indicated in table 2, own elaboration.
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Firstly, we performed a descriptive analysis of the previously formed clusters with
regard to the new profiling variables that we detailed in table 2. However, although
Northern Ireland was used in the previous cluster analysis, it turned out that there
was no data  for  most  of  the  new variables.  We therefore  decided to  leave the
cluster formed by Ireland and Northern Ireland out of the subsequent analysis. A
descriptive  analysis  of  these  variables  shows  distinctive  patterns  for  the  three
remaining clusters (table 9).
As  can be  seen,  the  homogeneity  of  the  ethnic  majority  within countries  is
higher in cluster 1 than the rest. On the other hand the percentage of immigrant
population is lower in cluster 1 and higher in clusters 2 and 3. Furthermore, the
level of secularization is remarkably different between clusters 1 and 2. Meanwhile
the  percentage  of  Roman Catholics  is  significantly  higher  in  cluster  3  than  in
clusters  1  and  2,  and  Protestantism mainly  distinguishes  cluster  2  from 3.  As
regards ideology, the percentage of rightist population seems to distinguish clusters
2 and 3 overall, while leftist ideology holders are slighter higher in cluster 3 than in
clusters  1  and  2.  The  politicization  of  the  centre-periphery  cleavage  seems  to
distinguish cluster 3, with a lower level of politicization than in clusters 1 and 2.
On  the  other  hand,  a  decreasing  trend  in  the  politicization  of  this  cleavage
distinguishes cluster 1 from the rest. The level of political decentralization is, on
average,  substantively  higher  in  cluster  3  than  clusters  1  and  2.  In  relation  to
economic and welfare variables, economic equality is slighter higher in cluster 2
than 3, and substantially higher than in cluster 1. Meanwhile the Gross Domestic
Product distinguishes cluster 2, with substantially higher values than in clusters 1
and 3. Finally, the absence of monopolization of patriotism by fascist, authoritarian
or totalitarian regimes distinguishes cluster 2 from the rest. 
Confirming  this  descriptive  analysis,  an  ANOVA  test  (assuming  unequal
variances of groups) shows that there is substantive variance between groups, as
well as within groups. Robust mean comparisons show that the clusters’ means for
each variable are significant different between groups. All of these also tend to
reinforce the idea that the results of our previous cluster analysis are valid.
However, we want to confirm whether these country-level variables do in fact
also correctly discriminate between the clusters of countries previously created. We
proceeded  in  two  steps.  In  the  first  place,  table  10  shows  the  results  of  a
Categorical  Regression  that  should  be  interpreted  only  in  the  sense  of  which
variables  are  relevant  for  distinguishing  between  clusters  and  the  relative
importance of independent variables with respect to each other. As can be seen, all
the  country-level  variables  included  in  the  analysis  are  statically  significant.
However,  economic  equality  (as  an  indicator  of  welfare)  is  the  most  relevant
variable to distinguish between the clusters. It  is followed in importance by the
historic experience of monopolization of patriotism, with GDP in third place. All
other variables, although statistically significant, contribute little to the explanation
of the dependent variable (only the ethnic majority could be mentioned as being
moderately  important).  As  we  shall  see,  the  importance  of  these  variables  is
confirmed in discriminant analysis.
As  a  second  step,  the  discriminant  analysis  carried  on  distinguishes  two
discriminant  functions  that  explain  75,5%  and  25,5%  of  the  variance  of  the
dependent variable (the three clusters), respectively. Table 11 shows that the first
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dimension  is  based  in  our  proxy  variable  for  welfare:  GINI.  There  are  other
variables  whose  greater  correlation  is  also  with  this  first  function  but  whose
coefficients are lower and cannot be considered statistically significant. This first
function distinguishes cluster 1 (more distant from the centroid of the function)
from cluster 2 and 3 (closer). The second function is defined basically by the level
of  political  decentralization  together  with  the  historical  experience  of  the
monopolization of patriotism, including other variables with low and insignificant
coefficients, however. This function distinguishes cluster 3 (closer to the centroid
of the function) from cluster 1 and 2 (more clearly from the latter). 
Table 10. Categorical regression using clusters of countries as dependent variable
Standardized
coefficients df F Sig.
Impor-
tance Tolerance
 Beta
Bootstrap
estimation
(1000) of
standard
error
    Aftertransf.
Before
transf.
ETNIA_MAY ,322 ,003 1 9986,025 ,000 -,153 ,128 ,128
INMIGRA_2008 ,200 ,011 1 312,567 ,000 ,073 ,045 ,045
NOREL ,125 ,021 1 33,913 ,000 ,054 ,019 ,019
PROTEST -,514 ,004 1 16786,329 ,000 -,070 ,321 ,321
LEFTPOP ,882 ,010 1 8155,466 ,000 ,010 ,052 ,052
POLIT_2008 ,177 ,006 1 881,546 ,000 ,009 ,252 ,252
POLIT_Trend -,074 ,007 1 110,259 ,000 -,032 ,114 ,114
RAI_2006 ,138 ,017 1 62,913 ,000 ,026 ,046 ,046
GINI_2008 -,625 ,012 1 2716,683 ,000 ,538 ,048 ,048
GDP_in_PPS_2008 ,431 ,015 1 875,893 ,000 ,202 ,042 ,042
MONOPOL ,668 ,022 1 955,777 ,000 ,340 ,015 ,015
R2=,971. Error stimation: 0,029
Variables were recodified before optimal scaling (see appendix).
Source: EVS 2008 and those indicated in table 2, own elaboration.
Choosing unequal probabilities for each group, the canonical functions improve the
correct assignation of cases in 88% for cluster 1, 69% for cluster 3 and 53% for
cluster 2.
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In  summary,  both  the  qualitative  regression  and  the  discriminant  analysis
support the importance of each of the contextual factor introduced in the analysis.
Thus, in relation to the theories posed before, we find clear evidence about the
instrumental dimension of identities linked with the development of welfare state,
and about the importance of political-administrative structures, the decentralization
of states in particular. Especially interesting is the fact that the explanation of the
Francoist  contamination  of  identity  in  Spain  do  also  seem  to  hold  for  other
countries;  that  is,  there  is  a  correlation  between  having  experienced  the
monopolization of patriotism by fascism, totalitarian or authoritarian regimes and
the of percentage state-wide national identity exhibited by its citizens; meanwhile
other variables such as the ethnic homogeneity of a country, religion and left-right
ideologies correlates also with the state-wide national identity, although with minor
influence on the creation or holding of state-wide national identities.
Table 11. Structure matrix of canonical functions
Function
1 2
GINI_2008 Cuantificación -,230* ,157
POLIT_Trend Cuantificación ,074* -,006
ETNIA_MAY Cuantificación -,073* ,064
NOREL Cuantificación ,067* -,038
INMIGRA Cuantificación ,058* -,017
MONOPOL 1-2 Cuantificación ,076 -,274*
RAI_2006 Cuantificación ,087 ,259*
PROTEST Cuantificación ,007 -,094*
GDP Cuantificación ,070 -,090*
LEFTPOP Cuantificación ,017 ,088*
POLIT_2008 Cuantificación -,004 -,085*
Note: The analysis uses optimal scaling transformations of variables as implemented by the 
Categorical Regression procedure in table 10.
Source: EVS 2008 and those indicated in table 2, own elaboration.
6. Conclusions
In relation to the grouping of countries, our analysis has shown that EU-15 states
exhibit significantly different patterns in the types of identity held by their citizens.
Thus,  there is  a group of countries characterized by a relatively lower level  of
national state-wide identity holders as compared to the group of regional identity
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holders. Not only is the percentage of national state-wide identity holders lower,
but the strength of the bond (national pride) is weaker than in the other clusters of
countries.  In  other  words,  despite  the  particular  explanations  about  the
exceptionality of Spain, it shares identity characteristics with its EU-15 neighbor
countries. The cluster of countries where Spain belongs, according to our analysis,
is clearly differentiated from others by the weaker links of their citizens with the
nation and their stronger attachment to the region.
Notwithstanding, the importance of the type of imagined community is much
more  relevant  for  distinguishing  cluster  of  countries  than  the  percentages  of
citizens holding national and regional identities. Thus, an ethno-cultural conception
of national identity as opposed to a civic understanding of national belonging is the
first and foremost characteristics distinguishing among groups of countries (mainly
cluster 2 from the rest).  Only in the third place,  does the percentage of people
feeling attached to  the  nation and region,  and the strength of  such attachment,
appear  as  an  important  element  form  discriminating  countries.  This,  however,
significantly  distinguish  cluster  three,  where  Spain  belongs,  from  the  rest  of
clusters.
Regarding the contextual variables that may explains particular configuration of
identities, all of them have shown their importance in our analysis. Thus, although
identity is an individual attitude, our analysis also shows that it is not independent
from certain country-level variables. 
 Economy and welfare, in the first place, appear to be relevant for distinguishing
among cluster of countries. Equal distribution of income (GINI coefficient), as an
indicator of welfare, is one of the most important variables that should be taken
into account when explaining different patterns of identity. Although this finding
partly  supports  the  hypothesis  of  instrumental  identities,  cluster  1,  with greater
differences in the redistribution of income (table 9),  shared some identity traits
with cluster 2 and others with cluster 3 (table 6). Therefore, we cannot establish a
direct  relationship  between  the  welfare  of  a  country  and  its  citizens’  national
identity at this moment. Our data however points toward and interesting direction
that  should  be  deeper  explored  in  the  future  with  longitudinal  data  and  the
appropriate multilevel design. 
We  find  also  empirical  evidence  for  the  importance  of  the  political-
administrative structure of the state in shaping national feelings. Thus, the level of
political decentralization, as suggested by the literature, appears among the most
relevant  country-level  variables  with  an  impact  on  identity  in  our  analysis.
Furthermore, in a way not suggested by the literature, our discriminant analysis put
together  the  decentralization  of  countries  and  recent  political  history  of
monopolization  of  patriotism by  fascist,  authoritarian  or  totalitarian  regimes  in
some countries within the same dimension. In line with this finding, we confirm
that cluster 3, where Spain belongs, formed by the more decentralized countries in
our sample, which have furthermore experienced the monopolization of patriotism
(table 9), also tend to exhibit lower levels of state-wide national identity holders,
higher levels of regional identity holders and a lower level of citizens proud to be
national (table 6).  This,  again, is nothing particular of Spain but a shared trend
among a group of countries. Much less important, but also statistically significant,
the politicization of the centre-periphery cleavage affects also national identities.
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An interesting question to be tested in the future is the possible interaction effects
between decentralization of  countries  and the politicization of  this  cleavage on
national identities.
Certainly, other variables related to the ethnic homogeneity of the people as
well as the percentages of immigration have also exhibited statically significant
impact. But perhaps the most relevant conclusion here is, precisely, their modest
influence  as  compared  to  economic  and  political-administrative  indicators.
Together  with  the  minor  importance  of  religion,  this  suggests  a  lowering
importance of the ethnic-cultural definition of identities at the aggregate level of
countries.  That  is,  however,  contradictory  with  the  importance  that  individual
citizens give to the fact of have been born, and to have ancestry, in the country.
This apparent contradiction is an interesting thread for new research as well. 
In the same line, ideology, compared to economic and political-administrative
indicators seem to have a limited impact on the configuration of national identities,
when considered at the aggregate level. It could be interesting to test if this is so
the  case  more  in  same  countries  that  in  other;  that  is,  to  see  if  there  is  any
interaction  effects  with  other  political-administrative  characteristics  of  the
countries: those included in this article as well as others. 
To conclude, we have put to test in an exploratory way, some preliminary ideas
and hypothesis regarding why national identities in Spain seem to be particularly
weak. This has been done by a quantitative empirical, systematic and international
comparison that  has given us valuable hints about  the importance of countries’
contexts in shaping their citizens’ national identities. This however, is a departing
point, not a closing one. Our findings open up for questions more than they give us
definitive answers. Having shown the plausibility and feasibility of this kind of
analysis,  we  shall  proceed  with  more  specific  designs  to  test  the  relative
importance of individual and contextual factors. The inclusion of new countries as
well as longer periods of times could also help improving our understanding of the
impact  of  context  on individual  identities.  These new analysis should take into
account  individual  and  contextual  variables  within  multilevel  models  to  try  to
clarify some apparent contradictions that emerge from our analysis, especially in
the  relative  importance  of  ethnic-cultural  or  civic-political  configuration  of
identities. 
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